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Abstract. This paper is concerned with the fundamental issue of the origins (or
emergence) of basic property rights such as the right of an individual to the fruits of his
labour. I develop a dynamic model of the strategic interaction between two players in
the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any rules,
regulations, laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My objective is
to address in a rigorous manner the questions of why, when and how basic property rights
can emerge and be made secure. In particular, I explore the roles of the players' 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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Property rights are important for a variety of reasons. In the absence of well-dened
and secure property rights, mutually benecial transactions may fail to occur, and
value-enhancing investments may fail to be undertaken. If, for example, my right over
the fruits of my labour are not secure (perhaps because they are vulnerable to theft),
then my incentive to work would be adversely aected. The fundamental importance of
secure property rights to the economic, social and political development of the poorer
parts of the world has been recently emphasized by the World Bank in their 1997
World Development Report The State in a Changing World. In many nation-states
today, property rights are insecure or non-existent, which is a fundamental reason for
these nation-states' failure to develop economically, socially and politically.1
There is a large literature that studies the role of the distribution of property rights
on economic outcomes. An early key contribution was Coase (1960), who argued
that in a \frictionless" environment, if property rights are well-dened and secure,
then economic eciency will typically be attained. In particular, the distribution of
property rights has no aect on economic eciency, although economic distribution
may be aected by who has what property rights. Subsequently, many authors have
explored the role of the distribution of property rights in environments with various
kinds of frictions. For example, Grossman and Hart (1986) have argued that in an
environment with incomplete contracting, the distribution of property rights will aect
economic eciency. There is now a large literature that builds on Grossman and
Hart's 1986 contribution; a main focus of that literature is on the issue of the optimal
distribution of property rights.2
1There are many empirical studies that show the adverse eects of weak or insecure property rights.
Let me mention some of them. Besley (1995) nds a signicant link between property rights and
investment in Ghana. Mauro (1995) and Svensson (1998) show in the context of cross-country studies
that weak property rights adversely aects aggregate growth. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)
nd that rms invest more in countries with secure property rights. For ve transition economies
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Johnson, McMillan and Woodru (1999) nd that
weak property rights limit the reinvestment of prots in startup manufacturing rms.
2For a recent survey of that literature, see Hart (1995).
1Almost all of the analyses in the economics literature on the role of property rights on
economic outcomes assumes | sometimes explicitly, but more often only implicitly
| that any specied distribution of property rights can be almost costlessly enforced
(by, for example, a third party such as the courts/state).3 The broad objective of this
literature is to study the impact that dierent distributions of property rights have on
economic outcomes. Much valuable insights have been provided by this literature.
This paper, on the other hand, is concerned with the fundamental issue of the origins
(or emergence) of secure property rights. The starting point of this paper is the state-
of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any property rights
(and any other institution such as the state). I shall construct a dynamic, repeated
interaction model of the state-of-nature in order to rigorously analyze the origins of
basic property rights. The analysis of my model will provide novel insights into the
conditions under which basic property rights can and cannot emerge. Furthermore,
and equally importantly, I shall explore the thorny issue of how such property rights
are enforced and made secure.
Mainstream economists have largely ignored the issue of the origins of secure property
rights by taking them as exogenously given. This might partly be because they see
this topic lying outside the scope of the discipline of economics. There is, in contrast,
a large literature in political and moral philosophy that is concerned with the origins
of the state and conceptions of a just society. That literature does indirectly (if not
directly) address the issue of the origins of basic property rights. Early notable contri-
butions to this literature were made by the great political philosophers such as Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in respectively Hobbes
(1651), Locke (1690), Hume (1739) and Rousseau (1762). Many important contribu-
tions to this topic were made in the twentieth century by John Rawls, Robert Nozick
and James Buchanan in respectively Rawls (1972), Nozick (1974), and Buchanan
(1975). The strengths of much of the more recent work lie in the formalization of
some of the ideas and arguments of the early political and moral philosophers | see,
for example, Gauthier (1986), Sugden (1986), Taylor (1987), and Binmore (1994 and
1998).
Although the political and moral philosophy literature contains a wealth of ideas and
informal arguments, and also some formal analyses, in this literature there is no model
3For example, as is discussed at great length in Buchanan (1975), this assumption lies at the
heart of the many contributions (such as Cheung, 1963, and Demsetz, 1967) on the economics of
property rights made in the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, those contributions do not concentrate
on explaining the emergence of secure property rights. Instead, their focus is on explaining changes
in property rights in a society with an established government.
2that is used consistently, in a unied and systematic manner, to address the issues
that arise in the study of the origins of basic property rights and other institutions.
In order to probe more deeply (and in a rigorous and consistent manner) into the
ideas and informal arguments put forward in this literature, and explore their range
of validity, and in order to obtain new insights, we need to construct an appropriately
detailed, rigorous and plausible model of the state-of-nature. This is precisely what
I shall do in this paper. The power of my model will be illustrated by the precisely
dened insights that it provides about the origins of basic property rights.
Some authors (such as Taylor, 1987) have informally argued that the state-of-nature
can be modelled as a standard repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game. This is overly
simplistic and somewhat inaccurate, partly because it leads to restrictive conclusions.
The model that I develop in this paper will be a richer, more accurate and general
representation of the strategic interaction in the state-of-nature. Equally importantly,
it will provide novel insights about the costs and benets of basic property rights. In
particular, I will show that they depend on the distribution of the initially endowed
characteristics amongst the players. For example, whether or not basic property rights
can potentially emerge, and the related issue of whether or not they can be enforced,
depends crucially on the distribution of the initially endowed productive and ghting
skills amongst the players. The crucial role played by the heterogeneity in such skills
on the origins of such property rights will be rigorously developed in this paper.
In developing my model I adopt Hobbes's viewpoint that in the state-of-nature, the
only \natural" right of man is the right to the use of his own physical power. The
emergence of secure property rights, and the nature of any transfers of output amongst
the various players, depends crucially on the use, and potential use of, violence and
force. Indeed, this perspective would appear to be vindicated by international events
in today's world; for example, it is all too clear that the United States of America's
inuence and power is derived as much from its productive skills and technologies as
from its ghting skills and military technologies.
James Buchanan in Buchanan (1975) presents an informal framework and analysis of,
in particular, the emergence of property rights that is also based on the Hobbessian
perspective. Although he does not conduct a formal and rigorous analysis, and does
not, in particular, provide an analysis of the conditions under which property rights
can be made secure (which is a crucial issue in understanding the origins of basic
property rights), his analysis provided me with much food for thought. John Umbeck
in Umbeck (1981) has developed a relatively more formal analysis of the origins of
basic property rights based also upon the Hobbessian perspective. But, like Buchanan
(1975), the crucial issue of the conditions under which (and how) the basic property
3rights can be made secure is not properly addressed. In the absence of any third
party in a state-of-nature with two players, the issue of how any property rights are
made secure becomes thorny. Indeed, property rights have to be self-enforcing in order
to be secure. But that requires adopting a dynamic perspective, and constructing a
dynamic, repeated interaction model of the state-of-nature. I should emphasize that
most scholars do, however, recognize that the \enforcement" issue is of fundamental
importance in understanding the origins of institutions such as property rights. See,
in particular, North (1990), which is a classic treatise that discusses this and other
related issues.
Given the absence of a global (or supranational) state, the world, at the international
level, is essentially in a state-of-nature. As such, my model may also be interpreted
in terms of the issue of the emergence of secure, \international-level" property rights.
My analysis and results may, therefore, contribute to the understanding of the cir-
cumstances under which such rights can and cannot emerge, and, furthermore, the
cirumstances under which nation-states would and would not engage in war.4
As a nal motivating factor, let me suggest that my model may also be useful in terms
of providing some insights into civil wars. A basic cause of many kinds of civil wars
is the absence of secure property rights. In particular, the state is so weak that it
is unable to enforce them. For example, the large-scale civil violence in the former
Soviet Union is linked to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
state. The war in the former Yugoslavia may be as well. Given the state-of-nature
type of environment within which many civil wars take place, my results may help
towards understanding the conditions that are required to hold for such conicts to
be peacefully negotiated.5
1.2 Overview
In this paper I study environments with exactly two players. This allows me to de-
velop an indepth understanding of several key aspects of the topic under consideration
without having to be concerned with the thorny issue of coalition formation that rears
its head when there are three or more players around. However, it may be noted that
the model of the two-player environment developed in this paper provides the back-
4There is, of course, a large literature in International Relations Theory that is concerned with
such issues. A good starting point is Powell (1999), who, unlike much of this literature, emphasizes
the role of formal, game-theoretic models in addressing the issues.
5There is a large literature on the economics of civil wars. For a good introduction to this
literature, see Collier and Hoeer (1998), and, Fearon and Laitin (1999).
4bone for the model of the three-player environment developed in my companion paper,
Muthoo (In Preparation), in which the issue of who forms a coalition with whom and
why is a focus of the analysis.
In section 2 below, I develop the basic framework that will be built upon in sub-
sequent sections to address the main issues of concern. Specically, in subsection
2.1, I lay down the base model of the state-of-nature, which constitutes the innite
repetition of a two-stage game. This model captures the essential, basic elements of
the strategic interaction between two players in an environment characterized by the
absence of property rights. In particular, two important constraints (one of which
I relax in section 5) built into the structure of the base model are that no explicit
communication between the players is allowed, and that the players cannot make any
(potentially desirable) investments in their respective productive and ghting skills.
Then, in subsections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, I characterize and study the properties
of the natural equilibrium | which, formally speaking, is the unique stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the base model. The \natural equilibrium" terminology,
which is taken from Buchanan (1975), aptly denotes the (equilibrium) outcome in the
absence of secure property rights. A key insight obtained here is that the absence of
secure property rights means that the fear of war is not absent, notwithstanding the
possibility that in the natural equilibrium no war actually takes place; and moreover,
it is the fear of war that determine's each player's ex-ante incentives to work and pro-
duce output. Another interesting insight obtained here is that an improvement in a
player's ghting skill makes him worse-o in the natural equilibrium if he is militarily
strong; but better-o otherwise.
Section 3 derives and studies the cost and benet to each player of establishing the
property rights under consideration. This involves comparing each player's payo
in the natural equilibrium with his payo in, what I shall call, the property rights
equilibrium, which is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the base model on
the assumption that secure property rights do exist. This exercise of exploring the
players' private incentives to establish the property rights (and how such incentives
depend on the players' potentially dierential ghting and productive skills) provides
some key insights about the conditions under which secure property rights can and
cannot emerge. For example, it will be shown that there exists congurations of
the players' ghting and productive skills under which the players' private incentives
to establish the property rights are in conict, in the sense that while one player
prefers the property rights equilibrium over the natural equilibrium, the other player
has the opposite preference. This is the case when, for example, one player is quite
unproductive but very strong, while the other player is quite productive but very weak.
5As is intuitive, in this case the former player will prefer the natural equilibrium over the
property rights equilibrium, while the opposite is the case for the latter player. Another
insight obtained is that in order to promote incentives to establish the property rights,
improvements in the players' productive skills (or economic prosperity) should go
hand-in-hand with improvements in their ghting skills (or military technologies).
A key aspect of the analysis of the emergence of secure property rights, which is
conducted in section 4, concerns the study of the appropriate incentive-compatibility
conditions that are required to hold for the emergence of self-enforcing property rights.
Formally, this analysis concerns the conditions under which the outcome associated
with the property rights equilibrium can be sustained as the outcome of some (nec-
essarily non-stationary) subgame perfect equilibrium of the base model. It will be
shown that for some congurations of the players' ghting and productive skills, and,
discount rates, secure property rights can emerge in the state-of-nature. However,
it will be shown that there exists congurations of values of such parameters under
which secure property rights can never emerge in the state-of-nature. For example,
unless the players do not discount future payos, secure property rights are unlikely
to emerge when their private incentives are in conict. Several key insights into the
roles of the players' ghting and productive skills on the emergence or otherwise of
secure property rights are derived. For example, it will be shown that improvements
in the military technology of a militarily strong player (such as the USA) can enhance
the likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights. On the other hand, im-
provements in the military technology of a militarily weak player may increase the
likelihood that existing secure property rights become insecure. All the results and in-
sights obtained in this section are based on the assumption that players cannot engage
in inter-player transfers of output, an assumption that is relaxed in the next section.
In Section 5, I extend the base model by giving the players the option to engage in
explicit communication. The main purpose of such communication is to allow the
players the opportunity to bargain over (potentially benecial) transfers of output
between them. Such bargained agreements, which are required to be self-enforcing,
enhance the likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights. In particular, it
will be shown that even if the players do discount future payos (to some extent) and
their private incentives are in conict, then the mechanism of inter-player transfers
of output can provide the basis for the emergence of secure property rights. The
results and insights obtained in this section are partly based on the fact that the
players always have a collective incentive to establish the property rights, which can
be potentially exploited through the mechanism of inter-player transfers of output.6
6The notion that there exists a \collective" incentive will be formally dened later on. Suce it
6I conclude in Section 6 with a summary of the main contribution of this paper, and,
with a discussion of the main limitations of my model and analyses. The latter will
suggest potentially fruitful extensions of my model that could be developed and studied
in future research.
1.3 Other Models of the State-of-Nature
My model | and the focus of my analysis | is quite dierent and unrelated to other
models of the state-of-nature. However, some of these other models do share some
(general) features with my model. I now highlight some of the main similarities and
dierences between them and my model.7
Bush and Mayer (1974) were perhaps the rst to study a formal model of the state-of-
nature. A basic weakness of their model is that it is static, and thus, they could not
address the key issue of the enforcement of property rights, an issue, however, that
they recognise to be an important one.
It is worth stressing upfront that an important and fundamental dierence between
my (dynamic, repeated interaction) model and all the other models of the state-of-
nature is that my model of the interaction between the two players in each period |
which, in the game theory terminology, denotes my stage game | is quite dierent
to the static model of Bush and Mayer (1974) which (or some variant of it) forms the
basis of the other models of the state-of-nature.
Houba and Weikard (1995) study a repeated interaction, bargaining model in which
the two parties negotiate over how much time each party should spend in each period
on productive and predatory activities. Since their analysis focuses on the case in
which the parties (eectively) do not discount future payos, any negotiated agreement
can be self-enforcing for any parameter values.8 Their main result is that there exists
bargaining equilibria in which the parties fail to reach any agreement (and thus, in each
period, the parties chooses their actions \non-cooperatively"). With the exception of
their model, my model is the only other model of the state-of-nature with repeated
interaction and in which the parties have the option to engage in negotiations over
to say here that it captures the notion that the players, when treated as \jointly", prefer the property
rights equilibrium over the natural equilibrium.
7By restricting this short review to those models which share some features with my model, I am
sure that I will fail to cite some good models of the state-of-nature. I apologise to authors of such
models for this omission.
8This implication is an immediate consequence of the well-known \Folk Theorem" result from the
Theory of Repeated Games.
7various relevant issues. But, beyond these two common, general features, my model
and the focus of my analysis is quite dierent. For example, their assumption that the
parties' discount factors are arbitrarily close to one eectively solves the enforcement
problem. In contrast, my analysis is specically concerned with the (more plausible)
case in which the parties do discount future payos. This is because my objective is
to develop a thorough understanding of the roles of the key parameters (namely, the
parties' productive skills, ghting skills, and, discount factors) on the emergence or
otherwise of secure property rights. Furthermore, in my model the parties negotiate
over whether or not to establish the property rights and over the level of ouput that
one player will transfer to the other player. It seems rather persuasive that in the
state-of-nature, the parties would engage in such negotiations. As such, my aim is
to explore the extent to which the mechanism of inter-player transfers of output can
enhance the likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights.
There is a large and growing literature that looks at the problem of resource alloca-
tion in a world where productive resources can be used to appropriate wealth as well
as to create it. Some notable examples of such models of conict include Skaperdas
(1992), Grossman and Kim (1995) and Hirshleifer (1995). For a nice introduction to
this literature, see Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000), which contains references to the
many other papers in this literature. A few basic ideas from that literature are related
to those in this paper such as the absence of the state and secure property rights.
However, this literature is not explicitly concerned with the issue of the emergence of
secure property rights and/or cannot address this issue since almost all of these models
are static. Their focus is on, amongst other issues, studying how various parameters
aect the equilibrium allocation of resources amongst productive and predatory ac-
tivities. A key, common feature (or assumption) that underlies most of the models in
this literature is that the players' outputs are aggregated into a common pool that is
at risk of being redistributed by force. As such, these models may be interpreted as
models of the right of access to common property.9 In contrast, my model is concerned
with private property rights. Furthermore, while a key concept in this literature is
the technology of conict (with the so-called Constant Success Function the oft-used
one), this plays a minor role in my model, partly since the focus of my analysis lies
elsewhere.
Bates, Greif and Singh (2000) study a repeated interaction model that has some simi-
lar features to the model that I study below. However, their focus is on the conditions
under which an unproductive third-party (a government) acts as the enforcer of prop-
9This point has, in fact, been recognised by | and forms the basis of the studies in | Grossman
and Kim (1995), and, Neary (1996).
8erty rights in return for some output (taxes) from the other two productive players.
As such, this contrasts with my analysis which focuses on the issue of the emergence
of secure property rights without recourse to any third party.
2 The Basic Framework
2.1 The Base Model
Time is divided into an innite number of periods, 1;2;3;:::, where each period
consists of T > 0 units of time. There are two players, A and B. The decisions that
each player has to take in each period, and the structure of the interaction between
them is dened in the following two-stage game, which, for future reference, I denote
by G.
Stage 1: [How much to work?]. At the beginning of each period the two players
simultaneously choose the quantities of time that they respectively will work. If player
i (i = A;B) works for Li units of time, where 0  Li  T, then he produces fi(Li)
units of output. The production function fi is twice dierentiable, increasing (f0
i > 0)
and concave (f00
i  0), and furthermore, fi(0) = 0.
Stage 2: [To ght or not to ght?]. At the end of each period both players observe
the quantities of output produced by each player, and then they simultaneously decide
whether or not to ght. If both players choose not to ght, then player i's levels of
consumption and leisure in this period are respectively fi(Li) and T   Li. On the
other hand, if at least one player decides to ght, then a ght takes place. There are
three possible (randomly determined) outcomes of a ght, namely:
 With probability pi player i wins the ght and steals all of player j's (j 6= i) output,
where pA > 0, pB > 0 and pA + pB  1. In this case player i's levels of consumption
and leisure in this period are respectively fA(LA) + fB(LB) and T   Li, while player
j's levels of consumption and leisure in this period are respectively 0 and T   Lj.10
 With probability 1   pA   pB no one wins the ght, the players retreat and no one
steals anything. In this case player i's (i = A;B) levels of consumption and leisure in
this period are respectively fi(Li) and T   Li.
10It is implicitly being assumed that no output can be consumed until after the outcome of a ght.
This modelling assumption is a simple way to capture the role of a ght on each player's incentives
to work.
9The (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility to player i in each period is Ui(c;l), where
c and l are respectively his levels of consumption and leisure in that period. I shall
assume that Ui takes the following (quasi-linear) form: Ui(c;l) = c+vi(l), where vi is
twice dierentiable, increasing (v0
i > 0) and strictly concave (v00
i < 0), and furthermore,
vi(0) = 0.11 Each player's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of his
expected utility, where i 2 [0;1) denotes player i's (per-period) discount factor.
Notice, therefore, that the base model constitutes the innite repetition of the two-
stage game G. It denes, in particular, the players' basic strategic interaction in
an environment in which neither player has property rights over the fruits of his
labour | that is, over the output that he produces by using as inputs his labour
and his productive skills. Hence, the relevance (in each period) of stage 2 when each
player considers stealing the output of the other player. As mentioned earlier, my
objective in studying this model is to address the questions of why, when and how
such property rights can emerge and be made secure. In particular, I shall study how
the players' ghting skills (as captured by the probabilities pA and pB) and productive
skills (as captured by the production functions fA and fB) impact upon the emergence
or otherwise of secure property rights.
A natural interpretation of the base model is implicit in its formal description: it
represents the interaction between two human beings (of the same gender) in the
state-of-nature. The following alternative interpretation is also potentially applicable:
the model represents the interaction between two organizations (such as two nation-
states or two maas) in the state-of-nature. While the former interpretation is perhaps
more useful from a theoretical perspective, the latter has much relevance to the world
in which we currently live.
It may be noted that in the base model a player can invest neither in his productive
skills nor in his ghting skills; each player has to live forever with what Mother Na-
ture endowed him with at the beginning of period 1. Furthermore, another implicit
assumption underlying the base model is that a player's endowments of time and skills
cannot be stolen. This means, in particular, that slavery is not allowed. I shall return
to these issues in section 6, where I shall also discuss the issue of relaxing various
other assumptions such as the implicit assumptions that for each i = A;B, pi and i
11I adopt this particular utility function partly to simplify the analyses (the additive separability
feature), and partly to capture the assumption that each player has risk-neutral preferences over
consumption. As is intuitive, under such an assumption the emergence of secure property rights is
that much harder.
10are exogenous and history-independent.12
I shall use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept (SPE, for short) to analyze the
base model. Furthermore, in order to somewhat simplify the analysis, but without
any signicant loss of generality, I shall rule out SPE in which a player uses a weakly
dominated strategy.
2.2 The Natural Equilibrium
In this subsection I shall characterize the unique stationary SPE of the base model. As
I mentioned in section 1, following Buchanan (1975) I call this the natural equilibrium,
partly because in this equilibrium secure property rights do not exist. As is well-
known, in a stationary SPE each player's equilibrium strategy is stationary: that is,
each player's equilibrium actions in each period do not depend on the actions taken
by the players in any previous period. Formally, a stationary strategy for player i
(i = A;B) is dened by a number Li and a function i : [0;T]2 ! ff;nfg, with the
following interpretation. In each period player i chooses to work for Li units of time,
and, i(LA;LB) indicates whether player i ghts (f) or does not ght (nf) in each
period at stage 2 conditional on the choices LA and LB made by the players at stage
1.
A stationary SPE of the base model is the repeated play of a SPE of the two-stage
game G. Hence, in order to derive the stationary SPE of the base model, I now derive
the SPE of the two-stage game G. Consider, therefore, the two-stage game G, and x
an arbitrary pair (LA;LB) chosen at stage 1. If the players end up in a ght at stage
2, then player i's expected payo is
E
f
i = piUi(b c;li) + pjUi(0;li) + (1   pi   pj)Ui(ci;li);
where j 6= i, b c = fA(LA) + fB(LB), ci = fi(Li) and li = T   Li. Letting E
nf
i denote
player i's payo if the players do not end up in a ght, where E
nf
i = Ui(ci;li), it follows
12An alternative interpretation of i is that 1 i is the probability with which player i dies in each
period. With this interpretation, it is natural to then argue that the probability with which player i
dies in any period depends on, amongst other variables, the outcome of the ght in that period (if a
ght occurs) and on the level of his consumption in that period. Furthermore, player i's probability
pi of winning a ght might depend on how healthy he is, which should depend on the levels of his
past consumption.





i () pifj(Lj) T pjfi(Li): (1)
The left-hand side of the second inequality in (1) is player i's expected net gain from
the ght: since the ght brings in an additional quantity of output (equal to fj(Lj))
with probability pi. On the other hand, the right-hand side of the second inequality in
(1) is his expected net loss from the ght: since in the ght he would lose all his output
with probability pj. In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that when indierent
between having a ght and not having a ght, each player prefers the latter. It thus









i then player i's WDA is to ght.
For future reference, I state this result in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Consider the two-stage game G, and x any pair (LA;LB) chosen at stage
1. Then, at stage 2, player i's (i = A;B) weakly dominant action (WDA) is not to
ght if and only if pifj(Lj)  pjfi(Li).
Lemma 1 implies that (in any SPE of the two-stage game G) a ght will not take
place at stage 2 if and only if the pair (LA;LB) chosen at stage 1 satises the following
equation:
pBfA(LA) = pAfB(LB): (2)
Notice that equation 2 implies, in particular, that each player's expected net loss from
a ght equals his expected net gain from a ght. It is instructive to note that a ght
takes place only if exactly one player's WDA is to ght. To put it dierently, it is
never the case that both players' WDA is to ght.
It is straightforward to show that for any pair (LA;LB) chosen at stage 1, player i's
(equilibrium) expected payo is i(Li;Lj), where13
i(Li;Lj) = (1   pj)fi(Li) + pifj(Lj) + vi(T   Li); (3)
which may be interpreted as follows. In the case of a ght, player i's total expected
13This is established as follows. First, consider a pair (LA;LB) that satises equation 2. In that
case the expected payo to player i is fi(Li) + vi(T   Li), which, however, equals i(Li;Lj) since
(by equation 2) pifj(Lj) = pjfi(Li). Now consider a pair (LA;LB) that does not satisfy equation 2.
In that case the expected payo to player i is (after simplifying) i(Li;Lj).
12consumption is the sum of the rst two terms: with probability 1   pj he consumes
all of his output, and with probability pi he consumes all of player j's output. In the
case of no ght (when pifj(Lj) = pjfi(Li)), he consumes all of his output and none of
player j's output.
Since the partial derivative of i with respect to Li is independent of Lj, and since
(given that f00
i  0 and v00
i < 0) i is strictly concave in Li, it follows that at stage 1
player i has a unique strictly dominant action (SDA), which is to work for LN
i units
of time, where LN
i is the unique solution of the following maximization problem:
max
0LiT
(1   pj)fi(Li) + vi(T   Li):
In order to simplify the exposition, but without any signicant loss of generality, I
shall adopt the assumptions on the parameters stated below in Assumption 1 which
are sucient for the maximization problem stated above to have an interior solution
(i.e., 0 < LN
i < T).14




i(0) (where i;j = A;B with
i 6= j).
Given Assumption 1, it follows that LN






i(T   Li): (4)
The left-hand of (4) is player i's marginal benet from working, while the right-
hand side is his marginal cost from doing so. I have thus established the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 (The Natural Equilibrium (NE)). The base model has a unique
stationary SPE | which will be called the natural equilibrium (NE, for short). Player
i's (i = A;B) equilibrium strategy is hLN
i ;N
i i, where LN








f if (LA;LB) 2 =
i
nf if (LA;LB) 2 
i;
14While the rst inequality in Assumption 1 is also necessary, the second is not necessary. However,
it is convenient to adopt it here since it will prove to be necessary for the existence of an interior
solution in another maximization problem stated in section 3.
13where  = f(LA;LB) : 0  LA;LB  Tg and 
i = f(LA;LB) 2  : pifj(Lj) 
pjfi(Li)g with j 6= i. In the natural equilibrium, player i's payo in each period is
V
N
i = i(Li;Lj) = (1   pj)fi(L
N
i ) + pifj(L
N
j ) + vi(T   L
N
i ):
Notice (from equation 4) that LN
i does not depend on the probability pi with which
player i steals player j's output. This is because that probability has no aect on
his marginal benet (or marginal cost) from working, although it will aect his NE
payo. On the other hand, LN
i is inuenced by the probability pj with which player
j steals player i's output. For example, an increase in pj | by decreasing player
i's marginal benet from working | decreases LN
i . Interestingly, however, for some
parameter values the NE satises equation 2, which means that no ghting takes
place in equilibrium.15 However, even then the NE working levels are inuenced by
the players' ghting skills. The intuition behind this is that even when no ghting
occurs in the NE, player i's (i = A;B) equilibrium marginal benet from working
is equal to the left-hand side of equation 4. This is because if player i unilaterally
deviates and chooses Li 6= LN
i , then a ght will occur | since such a deviation will
imply that equation 2 is no longer satised. The following (Hobbesian) interpretation
of this result is instructive. The absence of property rights over one's output means
that the fear of war is not absent, notwithstanding that in the NE no war takes place;
it is the fear of war that ultimately determines each player's incentives to work.
2.3 Fighting Skills and Natural Equilibrium Payos
I now explore the impact of the players' ghting skills on each player's NE payo.
First, I derive the eect of a marginal change in pj on V N
i (j 6= i). It is trivial
to verify (by, for example, using the Envelope Theorem) that @V N
i =@pj =  fi(LN
i ).
Hence, a marginal increase in player j's ghting skill decreases player i's NE payo,
and vice-versa. This is a fairly intuitive result.
I now consider the impact of a marginal change in pi on player i's NE payo. It will
15For example, equation 2 is satised when the players are identical: they have identical preferences,
identical productive skills and identical ghting skills | since it would then follow that LN
A = LN
B.
Equation 2 may also be satised when the players are not identical.















A marginal change in pi has two opposing eects on player i's NE payo. The rst
term on the right-hand side of (5), which is strictly positive, may be called the direct
eect of a marginal change in pi; it results from the fact that a marginal increase (for
example) in player i's ghting skill gives him (in expected terms) more of player j's
output. On the other hand, the second term on the right-hand side of (5), which is
strictly negative, may be called the strategic eect (or indirect eect) of a marginal
change in pi; it results from the fact that a marginal increase in player i's ghting skill
decreases player j's incentive to work, which, in turn, decreases the quantity of output
that player i can potentially steal. In Proposition 2 below, I establish that if pi is
suciently large, then a marginal increase in pi decreases V N
i ; otherwise, the opposite
holds. The intuition for this result comes from noting that if player i is suciently
strong, then the strategic eect dominates the direct eect. This is most transparent
in the following, extreme cases: if pi is close to one then (since LN
j is close to zero)
the direct eect is close to zero, while if pi is close to zero then the strategic eect is
close to zero. More precisely, I establish the following result:16
Proposition 2 (Fighting Skills and Natural Equilibrium Payos). Fix i;j =
A;B with i 6= j.
(a) Player i's NE payo V N
i is strictly decreasing in pj.
(b) If f000
j  0 and v000
j  0, then there exists p
i 2 (0;1) | where p
i is independent of




T 0 if pi S p

i:
Proof. While part (a) has been established above, the formal proof of part (b) is in
the Appendix.
The results stated in Proposition 2 imply that if some player's ghting skill improves,
then his opponent's NE payo decreases, while his own NE payo decreases or in-
creases depending on whether he is strong or weak. Since it seems intuitive that each
player would have a relatively greater incentive to establish the property rights the
16For future reference, I also state in this proposition the result established above concerning the
eect of pj on V N
i .
15smaller is his NE payo, these results suggest that military strength may enhance
the likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights. This suggestion | which I
fully and properly explore below in subsection 3.4 | is similar to the Mutual Assured
Destruction doctrine, which states that the prospects for peace are relatively better
when nation-states are militarily strong than militarily weak.
Another insight contained in Proposition 2 is that if each player could choose the
level of his ghting skill (through appropriate investments), then he would choose to
be strong, but not too strong. The intuition for this is that he would want to be
strong enough so as to be somewhat successful in ghting, but not too successful;
for otherwise his opponent would have no incentive to produce any output. Thus,
ignoring the direct costs of investment in ghting skills, the level of such investment
must balance, at the margin, the benet obtained from increasing the likelihood of
being able to win a ght against the indirect cost from inducing one's opponent to
produce less output.
2.4 Productive Skills and Natural Equilibrium Payos
I now explore the impact of the players' productive skills on each player's NE payo.
Suppose that player i becomes more productive, which I formalize as follows. Player
i's new production function is b fi, where for any Li > 0, b fi(Li) > fi(Li) and b f0
i(Li) >
f0
i(Li). Thus, not only is his total output higher for any level of labour input, but also
his marginal product is higher. An example is when fi(Li) = iLi and b fi(Li) = b iLi,
where b i > i > 0.
It is straightforward to show (using (4)) that player i would increase the amount of
time spent working: that is, b LN
i > LN
i . However, notice that player j would not change
the amount of time that he spends working: that is, b LN
j = LN
j . This is because player
i's productive skills do not aect player j's marginal benet or marginal cost from
working. Of course, it does aect his NE payo. Indeed, it is straightforward to verify
that both players' NE payos increase as player i becomes more productive.
Since, as I mentioned above, it seems intuitive that each player would have a relatively
greater incentive to establish the property rights the smaller is his NE payo, these
results suggest that an improvement in a player's productive skills may diminish the
likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights. This suggestion | which I fully
and properly explore below in subsection 3.5 | is not necessarily correct, since it fails
to take into account the positive eect of an increase in player i's productive skill on
his own payo when secure property rights do exist.
163 The Costs and Benets of Basic Property Rights
I now study the players' private incentives to establish the property rights under
consideration. Such private incentives dene the (private) costs and benets to the
players from establishing the property rights. I shall be particularly concerned with the
roles of the players' ghting and productive skills on their respective private incentives.
3.1 The Property Rights Equilibrium
In order to derive a player's private incentive to establish the property rights, I compare
his NE payo with his payo in the property rights equilibrium, where the latter
denotes the unique SPE of the base model on the assumption that secure property
rights exist; that is, on the assumption that the players are (irrevocably) committed
not to ght at stage 2 in any period. In the unique property rights equilibrium, player
i chooses to work for LF
i units of time, where LF




fi(Li) + vi(T   Li):
Given Assumption 1, it follows that LF
i is an interior solution; it is the unique solution





i(T   Li): (6)
For future reference, I state this result in the following lemma:17
Lemma 2 (The Unique Property Rights Equilibrium (PRE)). In the unique
property rights equilibrium (PRE, for short), player i (i = A;B) works for LF
i units of
time, where LF
i is the unique solution of equation 6. In the property rights equilibrium,





i ) + vi(T   L
F
i ):
It immediately follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 that LN
i < LF
i (i = A;B).
17It may be useful to note that the PRE can be stated as the following pair of stationary strategies:
for each i (i = A;B), Li = LF
i and F
i (:) = nf for any pair (LA;LB) 2 . Of course, Proposition 1
implies that the PRE is not an SPE of the base model.
17This \under-investment" result may be fruitfully interpreted as arising from a \hold-
up" problem: in the absence of secure property rights, player i does not receive the
full marginal return from his work, and hence, he does not work at his rst-best level.
Indeed, this interpretation is instructive as it draws attention to the close connection
between insecure property rights and hold-up problems. An important reason, for
example, for relatively little productive investment in the poorer parts of the world is
that the absence of secure property rights leads to hold-up problems, which, in turn,
adversely aects ex-ante incentives to invest.
3.2 Private Incentives







If A  0 and B  0, then there is no cost from having these property rights, only
benets. However, if for some i and j (where (i;j) = (A;B) or (i;j) = (B;A)) i > 0
and j < 0, then there is a cost and a benet from having these property rights; the
cost is to player j and the benet to player i. It should be noted that both A and
B cannot be negative, since | it is trivial to verify that | A + B  0.
A key insight obtained below is that the set of parameter values such that for some
i (i = A or i = B) i < 0 is non-empty. This insight challenges the not uncommon
viewpoint that the Prisoners' Dilemma game captures the (per-period) strategic in-
teraction in the state-of-nature; that is, the viewpoint that each and every player is
strictly better-o when property rights are secure. My insight is somewhat transparent
in the case, for example, when one player is fairly strong but fairly unproductive, while
the opposite is the case with regard to the other player. In that case it is intuitive
that the strong player would loose out when property rights are secure (since he would
then not be able to steal any output from the other, more productive player).18 It may
thus be noted that an important advantage of my model of the state-of-nature over
the Prisoners' Dilemma game based model is that it allows one to study the implica-
tions of heterogeneity in the players' ghting and productive skills on the emergence
of secure property rights.
18As I discuss in section 5, since the sum of the payos in the PRE exceeds the sum of the payos
in the NE, secure property rights might be established if, for example, the more productive player
transfers some output (in each period) to the less productive, but stronger player.
18It is straightforward to show that






















By denition, the left-hand side of the second inequality in (7) is greater than zero.
Hence, if the NE satises equation 2 | that is, if there is no ghting in the NE |
then the right-hand side of the second inequality in (7) equals zero. This implies the
following lemma:
Lemma 3 (No ghting in the NE and Private Incentives). If the natural equi-
librium satises equation 2 | that is, N
i (LN
A;LN
B) = nf for i = A;B | then A > 0
and B > 0.
The result contained in this lemma implies that if in the NE there is no ghting, then
both players have an incentive to establish the property rights under consideration.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3:
Corollary 1 (Identical Players). If both players are identical | that is, they have
identical preferences (vA(l) = vB(l) for all l 2 [0;T]), identical productive skills
(fA(L) = fB(L) for all L 2 [0;T]) and identical ghting skills (pA = pB), then A > 0
and B > 0.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that if the players are identical, then in the NE
no ghting occurs. The corollary then follows from Lemma 3.
An immediate implication of Corollary 1 is that in order for there to exist conict in
the players' private incentives to establish the basic property rights (i.e., in order for
i < 0 for some i), the players have to be dierent in some respects (such as in their
productive and/or ghting skills). That is:
 Heterogeneity in the players' ghting skills and/or productive skills is necessary for
it to be the case that i < 0 for some i (i = A or i = B).
It is trivial to verify that for any parameter values such that i < 0, it must be the
case that pifj(LN
j ) > pjfi(LN
i ) | that is, in the NE player i's WDA is to ght and
19player j's WDA is not to ght. This makes intuitive sense. The following corollary
implies, in particular, that the set of parameter values under which the players' private
incentives to establish property rights are in conict is non-empty.
Corollary 2 (Conicting Private Incentives). Fix i;j = A;B with i 6= j. If pj
is arbitrarily close to zero and pi > 0 but bounded away from one, then i < 0.
Proof. If pj is arbitrarily close to zero, then the dierence LF
i  LN
i is arbitrarily close
to zero, which, in turn, implies that the left-hand side of (7) is arbitrarily close to
zero. Hence i < 0 provided that pi > 0 but bounded away from one | where the
latter condition ensures that LN
j > 0.
The intuition behind Corollary 2 is as follows. If pj is arbitrarily close to zero, then it
is \as if" player i has property rights over his output, while pi > 0 means that player
j does not. Furthermore, since pi is bounded away from one, player j produces some
output. Hence, player i strictly prefers the NE over the PRE.
3.3 An Example: Identical Preferences and Linear Produc-
tive Skills
In order to develop some further insights concerning the role of the parameters on the
players' private incentives to establish the basic property rights, in this subsection I
study the case in which the players have identical preferences and linear productive
skills. In particular, assume that for each i = A;B, vi(l) =
p
l. Furthermore, assume
that each player's productive skills are \linear", in the sense that for each i = A;B,
there exists i > 0 such that fi(Li) = iLi. This implies that player i's marginal
productivity is constant and equals i. The condition






which we assume is satised by the parameters, ensures that Assumption 1 is satis-
ed. For example, this condition is satised for T suciently large. It follows from
Proposition 1 that in the NE, LN
i = T   [1=42
i(1   pj)2], and from Lemma 2 that in
the PRE, LF
i = T   (1=42
i). Applying (7), I obtain (after some simplication) that











20It follows immediately that if ipj > jpi (respectively, ipj < jpi) and T is suf-
ciently large, then i > 0 (resp., i < 0). The following claim is an immediate
consequence of this observation.
Claim 1 (Heterogeneity and Conict). Fix any pA, pB, A and B such that (8)
holds for both (i;j) = (A;B) and (i;j) = (B;A).
(i) If BpA > ApB then there exists a T such that for any T > T, A < 0 and
B > 0.
(ii) If BpA < ApB then there exists a T such that for any T > T, A > 0 and
B < 0.
The expression ipj is the output per unit of labour input that player i expects to
loose from a ght. It may be interpreted as the (constant) unit cost of ghting to
player i. The result contained in the above claim states that if the players' unit costs
of ghting dier (i.e., BpA 6= ApB), then (provided T is suciently large) at least
one player prefers the NE over the PRE | that is, the players' private incentives to
establish the property rights are in conict.
Assume that T is suciently large so that Claim 1 is applicable. Suppose that player
i is more productive than player j (i.e., i > j), and that player i is weaker than
player j (i.e., pi < pj). It follows from Claim 1 that player i prefers the PRE over the
NE, while player j prefers the NE over the PRE. Thus, when one player is stronger
and the other more productive, the stronger player prefers the NE while the more
productive prefers the PRE. Now suppose that player i is also the more stronger of
the two players (i.e., i > j and pi > pj). It follows from Claim 1 that if pi=pj > i=j
then player i prefers the NE over the PRE, but if pi=pj < i=j then he prefers the
PRE over the NE. Thus, when player i has absolute advantage over player j in both
production and ghting, his preference between the PRE and the NE depends on his
comparative advantage. If his comparative advantage lies in ghting, then he prefers
the NE over the PRE. But if his comparative advantage lies in production, then he
prefers the PRE over the NE. I summarise these insights in the following claim.
Claim 2 (Comparative Advantage and Conict). Assume that T is suciently
large so that Claim 1 is applicable. Furthermore, x i;j = A;B with i 6= j.
(i) If i > j and pj > pi, then i > 0 and j < 0.
(ii) If i > j, pi > pj and pi=pj > i=j, then i < 0 and j > 0.
(iii) If i > j, pi > pj and pi=pj < i=j, then i > 0 and j < 0.
213.4 The Eects of Fighting Skills on Incentives
Since ghting skills have no eect on each player's PRE payo, it follows immediately
from Proposition 2 that an improvement in player i's ghting skill enhances both
players' private incentives to establish the property rights provided that player i is
suciently strong.
An interesting question | which I now address | is whether or not both players'
private incentives to establish the property rights are enhanced if the ghting skills of
both players were to improve? Fix, therefore, an arbitrary conguration of the players'
ghting and productive skills, and suppose that both players' ghting skills improve
by an identical, small amount. In that case, the (total) change in player i's private
incentives is formally captured by the sum of the partial derivative of i w.r.t. pi and
the partial derivative of i w.r.t. pj. Given the expressions for the derivatives of V N
i
w.r.t. to pi and pj stated above in subsection 2.3, it follows (since the derivatives of
V F
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In general, this expression can be positive or negative. However, if the players are
identical, then this expression is strictly positive.19 This means that if the players
are identical, then a small (and identical) improvement in both players' ghting skills
enhances their respective private incentives to establish the property rights.
A key implication of this result is that in a state-of-nature with identical players, the
players' private incentives to establish the property rights | and thus, not engage in
war | are maximised when each player is militarily as strong as he can be (i.e., their
common level of ghting skill is set equal to 1/2). As indicated above in subsection
2.3, this conclusion can be interpreted as a formal statement of the Mutual Assured
Destruction doctrine.
Another interesting question that is especially relevant when (in section 5) I extend
the base model by allowing the players to communicate with each other and negotiate
over inter-player transfers of output is whether or not the players' collective incentive
is enhanced when one or both players become more strong? The \collective" incentive
is formally captured by the sum A + B; it denes the aggregate net surplus from
having property rights. It is straightforward to show that for any pA, pB, fA and fB,
19This is because if the players are identical (in the obvious sense as, for example, specied above
in Corollary 1), then (since LN
i = LN
j and fi  fj) the rst two terms cancel out.












which is strictly positive. This result makes intuitive sense, since the net eect of a
marginal increase in pi is that in the NE, player j produces less output (the strategic
eect), which decreases both players' NE payos, and hence, enhances the collective
incentive. It immediately follows that (whether or not the players are identical) the
collective incentive to establish the property rights are increasing in each player's
ghting skill. This result, which is related to the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine,
implies that the collective incentive is maximised only if pA +pB = 1 (i.e., war should
have a victor).
It is instructive to pursue this issue a bit further by determining the values of pA and
pB that maximise A + B. Given the results established above, it follows that the


















pA + pB = 1: (10)
It is easy to derive closed-form solutions to these equations under the assumptions of
the example studied in the previous subsection, namely, assuming \linear" productive
skills (fi(Li) = iLi) and identical preferences (vi(l) =
p
l). It is straightforward to

















Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, if the players have identical productive skills, then
the collective incentive is maximised when the players have identical and maximal
ghting skills. However, if player i is relatively more productive than player j, then
the collective incentive is maximised when player j has relatively better ghting skills.
Notice that the ratio p
A=p
B is strictly increasing in the ratio B=A. As player B's
productive skill relative to that of player A's traverses from zero to innity, player A's
\collective-incentive maximising" level of ghting skill relative to that of player B's
traverses monotonically from zero to one. The intuition behind these results follows
20Intuitively, condition 9 equates the marginal change on A + B through pA to the marginal
change on A + B through pB, while condition 10 has been established above.
23by noting that the levels of the ghting skills which maximise the collective incentive
are the same which minimize the sum of the players' NE payos.
3.5 The Eects of Productive Skills on Incentives
Now suppose that player i's productive skill improves (in the manner formalized above
in subsection 2.4). It is straightforward to show that the increase in his PRE payo is
larger than the increase in his NE payo. As such, as he becomes more productive, his
private incentive to establish the property rights enhances; and this makes intuitive
sense. However, since player i's productive skills have no eect on player j's PRE
payo it follows from the results established above in subsection 2.4 that player j's
private incentive to establish the property rights diminishes, which also makes much
intuitive sense.
Given the above conclusion, one can ask whether or not both players' private incentives
to establish the property rights are enhanced if both players were to become more
productive? I address this question in the context of the example studied above in
subsection 3.3 (with linear productive skills and identical preferences), by computing
the sum of the partial derivative of i w.r.t. i and the partial derivative of i w.r.t.





















In general, this expression can be positive of negative. However, if the players are
identical, then this expression is strictly negative. This means that if the players are
identical, then a small (and identical) improvement in both players' productive skills
diminishes their respective private incentives to establish the property rights.
If, as seems plausible, low productive skills are interpreted as signs of poverty while
high productive skills as signs of economic prosperity, then this result suggests that in a
state-of-nature with identical players, the private incentives of the players to establish
the property rights are relatively greater when they are both poor than when they are
both economically prosperous.
It is straightforward to show that whether or not the players are identical, their col-
lective incentive to establish the property rights is diminished as one (or both) players
become more productive. This conclusion is an immediate consequence of the result
that for each i;j = A;B with i 6= j, the partial derivative of the sum i +j w.r.t i
is strictly negative.
24In a nutshell, then, the results established here suggest that economic prosperity ad-
versely aects the players' collective incentive and their respective private incentives to
establish the property rights. All of these results concerning the eects of improvements
in productive skills on private and collective incentives indicate that improvements in
productive skills increase the cost of establishing the property rights more than they
increase the benet of having such rights | where the cost comes from the fact that a
player can no longer steal his opponent's output, and the benet from increased levels
of outputs.
Remark 1 (A fundamental Insight concerning Incentives). It is instructive to
bring together the main insight obtained in this subsection with that obtained in the
previous subsection: namely, while economic prosperity adversly aects incentives
to establish property rights, military strength aects them positively. As such, in
order to promote and maintain such incentives, it would seem that improvements in
the players' productive skills (or economic properity) should go hand-in-hand with
improvements in their ghting skills (or military technologies). This fundamental
insight appears, at least by casual observation, to be borne out by the historical path
of human development. Furthermore, as I will explore further in later sections of this
paper, it is an insight that bears upon the issue of the emergence of secure property
rights in today's world.
4 On the Emergence of Secure Property Rights
I now turn attention to the main issue of concern in this paper, namely, the issue of
the emergence of secure property rights. Formally, this issue is addressed by studying
the conditions under which there exists a (necessarily, non-stationary) SPE whose
equilibrium path is identical to the PRE path | namely, in each period, Li = LF
i
(i = A;B) and no ght occurs. Since the PRE is not an SPE of the base model, the
PRE path can potentially be sustained as a SPE path only by the threat of appropriate
(and credible) punishment should any player unilaterally deviate from the PRE path.21
It is worth emphasizing that property rights are therefore made secure (when they
can be) in a self-enforcing manner, without any third-party enforcement. Indeed,
since there are no third parties in the world under consideration, any enforcement
mechanism can only involve the two players.
21This is, of course, a familiar idea from the Theory of Repeated Games.
25Remark 2 (Issues of Interpretation). In subsections 4.1 and 4.3 below, I study
the issue of the existence of two dierent non-stationary SPE whose equilibrium paths
coincide with the PRE path. The analysis focuses on the study of the appropriate
incentive-compatibility conditions that are required to be satised for these equilibria
to exist. In particular, I will characterize the congurations of the players' ghting and
productive skills under which these conditions are and are not satised. Since there
exists many other SPE in the base model | in particular, the NE is always an SPE
| how should one interpret the existence of the two non-stationary SPE described
below? A most appropriate interpretation is that the existence of such equilibria
implies that it is possible for secure property rights to emerge in the state-of-nature.
Given the multiplicity of the SPE, I cannot (and do not) make the claim that secure
property rights are bound to emerge; for after all, the players may be stuck in the NE.
However, if the parameters (including the players' ghting and productive skills, and
their respective discount factors) are such that the existence of one of these SPE is
assured, then the players could implicitly (if not explicitly) establish secure property
rights by moving play from the NE to this non-stationary SPE. In subsection 4.2 below,
on the other hand, I characterize a set of parameter values under which there cannot
exist any SPE whose equilibrium path is the PRE path. The natural interpretation of
this result is that for such a set of parameter values, secure property rights can never
emerge in the state-of-nature; here I can (and do) make the claim that secure property
rights are bound not to emerge when the parameters belong to this set.
4.1 The Trigger-Strategy Equilibrium
I begin the analysis, in this section, by using the relatively simple, and fairly well-
known \trigger-strategy" approach. The idea is to sustain the PRE path as a SPE
path by moving play to the NE if any player ever (unilaterally) deviates from the PRE
path. That is, a deviation from the PRE path triggers reversion to the NE. Since
this punishment path is a SPE path, it is relatively easy to derive the appropriate
incentive-compatibility conditions under which these trigger strategies constitute an
SPE.22
22More precisely, the trigger strategy for player i (i = A;B) is as follows. The amount of work
L1
i that he chooses in period 1 equals LF
i . In period n (n = 2;3;:::), Ln
i = LF
i if in each preceding
period (i.e., in periods 1;2;::: ;n   1) players A and B respectively worked for LF
A and LF
B units of
time, and no ght occurred. Otherwise Ln
i = LN
i . Furthermore, in period n (n = 1;2;:::), n
i = nf
if in each preceding period and in this period (i.e., in periods 1;2;::: ;n) players A and B respectively
worked for LF
A and LF
B units of time, and in each preceding period (i.e., in periods 1;2;::: ;n 1) no
ght occurred. Otherwise n
i  N
i .
26The following argument establishes the condition under which player i (i = A;B)
cannot benet from a (one-shot, unilateral) deviation from the PRE path.23
Fix an arbitrary period n (where n = 1;2;:::), and suppose that up until the end of
period n 1 neither of the two players deviated from the PRE path. Player i considers
(at stage 1 of this period) the net benet from a (one-shot, unilateral) deviation in
which he chooses Ln
i 6= LF
i (and conforms to the trigger strategy thereafter). His
payo from not conducting such a deviation (and thus conforming to the trigger
strategy) is, of course, V F
i =(1   i). On the other hand, his payo from the (one-
shot) deviation of setting Ln
i = Li, where Li 6= LF
i , equals i(Li;LF
j )+iV N
i =(1 i).




j ) + iV N
i =(1   i), it follows that player i cannot benet from a (one-shot)
deviation to any Ln
i 6= LF
i if and only if24




j )   V
F
i ]: (11)
Now suppose that player i conforms at stage 1 of period n (by setting Ln
i = LF
i ), but
considers whether or not to conduct a (one-shot) deviation at stage 2. It is trivial
to verify that he will conform to his trigger strategy (and not ght) if and only if
ii  (1   i)[i(LF
i ;LF
j )   V F
i ].25 Since i(LN
i ;LF
i ) > i(LF
i ;LF
i ), it follows that
this inequality is implied by (11).26 I have thus established the following proposition.27
23From the One-Shot Deviation Property it thus follows that he cannot benet from deviating to
any strategy | that may involve more than just a one-shot deviation. The One-Shot Deviation
Property, which is also known by other terms, is essentially the principle of optimality for discounted
dynamic programming. A pair of strategies is a SPE if and only if each player's strategy is immune
to protable one-shot (unilateral) deviations. For a precise statement of this result, see, for example,
Abreu (1988, Proposition 1), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Theorem 4.2), and Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994, Exercise 123.1).
24The left-hand side of inequality 11 is player i's (long-run) average cost from the (optimal, one-
shot) deviation; this is because from next period onwards, his per-period loss is V F
i   V N
i (i.e.,
i). Note that, as is standard, a player's average payo is 1   i times his present discounted
value. Furthermore, the right-hand side of inequality 11 is player i's (short-run) average benet
from the (optimal, one-shot) deviation; this is because his (one-period) gain from this deviation is
i(LN
i ;LF
j )   V F
i .
25If the pair (LF
A;LF
B) satises equation 2, then i(LF
i ;LF
j ) = V F
i . But if this pair does not satisfy
(2) then we have the following result. If pifj(LF
j ) > pjfi(LF
i ) (where i;j = A;B with i 6= j), then
i(LF
i ;LF
j ) > V F
i and j(LF
i ;LF
j ) < V F
j .
26This conclusion makes sense, since (by being able to adjust Li) a one-shot deviation at stage 1
is (in principle) relatively more benecial than a one-shot deviation at stage 2.
27It may be noted that since i(LN
i ;LF
j ) = V N
i +pi[fj(LF
j ) fj(LN
j )], inequality 11 becomes (after
substituting for i(LN
i ;LF




27Proposition 3 (The Trigger-Strategy Equilibrium (TSE)). The pair of trigger
strategies described above is a SPE if and only if the following two inequalities hold:










This SPE will be called the trigger-strategy equilibrium (TSE, for short). Since the
TSE path is the PRE path, in equilibrium no ght ever occurs, and in each period
player i (i = A;B) works for LF
i units of time. Furthermore, of course, player i's
TSE payo in each period equals V F
i .
I now explore some of the implications of this proposition for the emergence of secure
(or self-enforcing) property rights. Since the right-hand side of both (12) and (13) are
strictly positive, it immediately follows, not surprisingly, that if the players' private
incentives to establish these rights are in conict | that is, i < 0 for some i (i = A or
i = B), then the PRE path cannot be sustained as a SPE using the trigger strategies.
For future reference, I state this result in the following corollary:
Corollary 3 (Conicting Private Incentives and Non-Existence of the TSE).
If the parameters are such that the players' private incentives to establish the basic
property rights are in conict (i.e., i < 0 for some i), then the TSE does not exist.
Indeed, the TSE exists only if the parameters are such that both players prefer the PRE
over the NE | that is, the parameters are such that A  0 and B  0. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the incentive-compatibility conditions ((12) and (13)) which ensure
that the property rights are self-enforcing are much more severe than the conditions
(A  0 and B  0) which ensure that the players would like to have these rights
established.
It is useful to rewrite (12) and (13) respectively as follows:
A  A (14)
B  B; (15)
where i = 1  
i
pi[fj(LF
j )   fj(LN
j )]
; (j 6= i): (16)
28Thus, the TSE exists if and only if player i's (i = A;B) discount factor lies above
the critical value stated in (16), which depends upon the parameters. It is trivial
to note that i < 1 if and only if i > 0. Furthermore, i > 0 if and only if
pi[fj(LF
j )   fj(LN
j )] > i, which, in turn, is if and only if i(LN
i ;LF
j )   V F
i > 0. It
follows immediately from the results stated in footnote 25 that if the pair (LF
A;LF
B)
satises equation 2 then i > 0 for both i = A and i = B; but if pifj(LF
j ) > pjfi(LF
i )
(where i;j = A;B with i 6= j) then i > 0 while j could be positive or negative. In
conclusion, then, I have established the following result.
Corollary 4 (Existence of the TSE). For any parameter values such that A > 0
and B > 0 the TSE exists provided that, in addition, the parameters are such that
player i's (i = A;B) discount factor i  i, where i (dened above in 16) is strictly
less than one. Furthermore, for at least one i (i = A or i = B) | if not for both i
(i = A and i = B) | i > 0.
I now examine the impact of the players' ghting skills on the critical discount factors




Thus, a marginal increase (for example) in player j's ghting skill makes player i more
likely to \cooperate" (in the sense of respecting the basic property rights). This result
makes intuitive sense: a marginal increase in pj reduces V N
i (cf. Proposition 2(a)),
which, in turn, makes deviation from the PRE path less attractive to player i. As I
now show, a marginal change in pi, on the other hand, aects player i's willingness
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T 0 where j 6= i: (17)
Proposition 2(b) above states that player i's NE payo V N
i is not monotonic in pi,
and hence, it immediately follows (from (17)) that i is not monotonic in pi either.
However, using Proposition 2(b) it is straightforward to establish the following result:28
28For future reference, I also state in this corollary the result established above concerning the
eect of pj on i.
29Corollary 5 (Fighting Skills and TSE). Fix i;j = A;B with i 6= j.
(a) Player i's critical discount factor i is strictly decreasing in pj.
(b) If f000
i  0 and v000




T 0 if pi S b pi:
Proof. While Corollary 5(a) has been established above, Corollary 5(b) can be derived
by using Proposition 2(b) and (17).29
These (comparative-static) results may be interpreted as follows. As player i's ghting
skill increases (for example), his opponent becomes more likely to cooperate, while he
himself becomes less or more likely to cooperate depending on whether or not he
is suciently weak. These results have a number of implications, which, in general
terms, may be put as follows:
 If player i is suciently strong and secure property rights do not exist, then a
marginal increase in player i's strength may create the conditions for the emergence
of secure property rights. But, if player i is suciently strong and secure property
rights do exist, then a marginal decrease in player i's strength may create conditions
for the property rights to be no longer secure.
 If player i is suciently weak, then, whether or not secure property rights exist, a
marginal change in player i's strength may create the conditions for the non-existence
of secure property rights.
Figure 1 illustrates, in more specic terms, the eect of a small increase in pi on the
emergence of secure property rights (via the TSE). The initial critical discount factors
are i and j, while the critical discount factors after a small increase in pi are b j for
player j, b 
s
i for player i if he is strong and b 
w
i if he is weak.30 I now provide some
interpretation of the various regions in Figure 1.
In regions 1{6 the parameters are such that both initially and after a small increase
in pi, at least one of the player's critical discount factor lies above his discount factor.
Thus, at least one of the player's discount factor is so small that a small increase in pi
has no eect on the issue of the existence of the TSE; secure property rights do not
exist initially, and do not exist after a small increase in pi.
29It may be noted that p
i, which is dened in Proposition 2(b), is less than b pi.





















Figure 1: An illustration of the eect of a small increase in pi on the existence of the TSE.
In regions 7{9 the parameters are such that initially i and/or j are too small (lie
below their respective initial critical discount factors), and the TSE does not exist.
However, after a small increase in pi player j is willing to cooperate, and player i is
willing to cooperate if and only if he is strong. An important insight provided by
this result may be put as follows. An improvement in the military technology of a
militarily strong player (such as the USA) can improve the likelihood of the emergence
of secure property rights.
In region 10 secure property rights do exist initially, and remain in place after a small
increase in pi if and only if player i is strong. An important insight provided by this
result may be put as follows. An improvement in the military technology of a militarily
weak player may increase the likelihood that existing secure property rights become
insecure.
In region 11 the TSE does not exist initially, but does after a small increase in pi (by
essentially making player j willing to cooperate). Finally, in region 12 the parameters
are such that the players' discount rates are so high that they always lie above the
relevant critical discount factors.
I now briey examine the impact of the players' productive skills on the critical dis-
count factors A and B, where an improvement in a player's productive skills are
31formalized in the manner specied above in subsection 2.4. Since, as has been es-
tablished in subsection 3.5, an improvement in player i's productive skill enhances his
private incentives (i.e., increases i), it immediately follows from (16) that i decreases
following an improvement in player i's productive skill. Thus, the more productive a
player, the more willing is he to cooperate (and respect the property rights). What
about his opponent? As player i's productive skills improve, it has been shown in
subsection 3.5 that j decreases. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that the dierence
between player i's output levels in the PRE and NE is higher the more productive he
is. It then immediately follows that j increases following an improvement in player i's
productive skill. Thus, the more productive a player, the less willing is his opponent
to cooperate.
4.2 A General Negative Result
It has been shown above that there exists a non-empty set of parameter values under
which the TSE does not exist. In particular, if the parameters are such that the
players' private incentives to establish the property rights are in conict (i.e., i < 0
for some i), then the TSE does not exist. Does this mean that for such parameter
values, secure property rights cannot emerge in the state-of-nature? In order to answer
this question, one needs to, in principle, study the set of all non-stationary SPE of the
base model. The point is that there might exist a non-stationary SPE (dierent from
the TSE) that does sustain the PRE path as a SPE path for a relatively wider set of
parameter values. However, in this section, I characterize a set of parameter values
under which there does not exist an SPE that sustains the PRE path.31
Let V i denote the worst SPE (average) payo to player i. Thus, by denition, the
average payo to player i in any SPE is greater than or equal to V i. The following
result lies at the heart of the analysis to follow:32
Lemma 4. If either one of the two inequalities stated below fails to hold, then there
31In the next subsection, I construct a non-stationary SPE (dierent from the TSE) that does
sustain the PRE path as SPE path even when i < 0 for some i (provided that the players, eectively,
do not discount future payos).
32This result is a straightforward application of some rather powerful results contained in Abreu
(1988).
32does not exist an SPE of the base model in which the PRE path is the equilibrium path:
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A) + BV B;
where V i denotes player i's worst SPE payo.
Proof. The argument can be made by contradiction. Thus, suppose (to the contrary)
that there exists an SPE in which the PRE path constitutes the equilibrium path of
play, and in which, for example,
V
F




B) + AV A: (18)
Now suppose player A considers making a one-shot, unilateral deviation from the
equilibrium path of play. His (average) payo from not doing so is, of course, V F
A .
His (average) payo from doing so is greater than or equal to the right-hand side
of inequality 18. This is because in the period in which he unilaterally deviates, his
optimal deviation is to set LA = LN
A, and thus, in that period his payo is A(LN
A;LF
B).
His continuation equilibrium average payo (from the next period onwards) must, by
denition, be greater than or equal to V A. Consequently, given inequality 18, it is
optimal for player A to conduct the one-shot, unilateral deviation. But this is a
contradiction.
As is well-known, it is not easy to characterize the worst SPE payos to players in
innitely repeated games. And this is also the case here; I have not been able to
characterize V i. However, one lower bound on it can be easily characterized; and that
is player i's minimax payo. It follows from an application of a well-known result that
in any Nash equilibrium of the base model, player i's average payo is greater than or
equal to his minimax payo. I now derive player i minimax payo. The worst (from
player i's perspective) possible strategy that player j could adopt is the one in which
in each period, player j chooses not to work at all, and chooses to always ght (for
any choices made in the past). The payo per period to player i if player j adopts
this (minimax) strategy is (1 pj)fi(Li)+vi(T  Li), which is maximised at Li = LN
i .
Hence, player i's minimax payo is
wi = i(L
N





The following result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4 and the observation
33that V i  wi.33
Proposition 4 (Non-Emergence of Secure Property Rights). If the parameters
are such that either one of the two inequalities stated below fails to hold, then there
does not exist an SPE of the base model in which the equilibrium path is the PRE path:


























(j 6= i): (24)
It follows from Proposition 4 that the PRE path cannot be sustained in any SPE of
the base model if some player's discount factor, say player i's, lies below the critical
value stated in (24), which depends upon the parameters. It is straightforward to note
that since i + pifj(LN
j ) > 0, it follows 

i < 1. Furthermore, note that 

i > 0 if and
only i > 0. Hence, from the results stated in the previous section (immediately after
(16)), if the pair (LF
A;LF
B) satises equation 2 then 

i > 0 for both i = A and i = B;
but if pifj(LF
j ) > pjfi(LF
i ) (where i;j = A;B with i 6= i) then 

i > 0 while 

j could
be positive or negative. In conclusion, then, I have established the following result.
Corollary 6 (Non-existence of SPE with the PRE path). For any parameter
values such that for some i (i = A or i = B) player i's discount factor i < 

i
there does not exist an SPE of the base model whose equilibrium path is the PRE path,
where for at least one i (i = A or i = B) | if not for both i (i = A and i = B) |


i > 0. Furthermore, for each i (i = A;B) 

i < 1.
33Since V i  wi, the inequalities stated in the proposition are eectively the inequalities stated in
Lemma 4 but replacing V i with wi, and then substituting for i(LN
i ;LF
j ) and wi, and then nally
simplifying and rearranging terms.





B. After substituting for i in the expression for 
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Hence, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2(b):
Corollary 7 (Fighting Skills and Non-Emergence of Secure Property Rights).
Fix i;j = A;B with i 6= j.
(a) If f000
j  0 and v000
j  0, then there exists p
i 2 (0;1) | where p
i is independent of









i  0 and v000
i  0, then there exists p
j 2 (0;1) | where p
j is independent of





T 0 if pj T p

j:
Corollary 7 implies that a marginal change in player i's ghting skill will, in general,
have an ambiguous eect on the range of discount factors under which secure property
rights cannot emerge in the state-of-nature. For example, if player i is weak (i.e., pi
is small), then a marginal increase in his ghting skill increases 

i but decreases 

j.
However, unambiguous results can be obtained in some special cases. Consider, for
example, the case in which the players' discount factors are identical (i.e., A = B =
), and, in which their ghting and productive skills are such that 
A > 
B. It follows
from Proposition 4 that in this case, secure property rights can never emerge in the
state-of-nature if  < 
A. Hence, it immediately follows from Corollary 7 that an
improvement in player A's ghting skill increases the likelihood that secure property
35rights can never emerge if player A is weak; while the opposite is the case if player A
is strong.
4.3 The Mutual Minimax Equilibrium
While the above subsection establishes a \negative" result, in this subsection I estab-
lish a \positive" result; I shall show (by construction) that there exists a non-stationary
SPE whose equilibrium path is the PRE path for any parameter values provided that
the players are suciently patient.
The TSE is built upon the idea that the punishment path is the NE path. Two key
properties of the TSE are as follows. Firstly, deviation by any player from the TSE
path (which is the PRE path) entails the loss of the property rights forever after.
And, secondly, in the punishment path of the TSE, player i's payo in each period
is V N
i . In contrast, the two corresponding properties of the SPE constructed in this
section are as follows. Deviation by any player from the PRE path entails the loss of
property rights for only a nite number of periods, after which the property rights are
re-established. Furthermore, in the punishment path player i's payo is strictly less
than V N
i . It is this latter property which allows the PRE path to be sustainable (as
a SPE path) for parameter values such that i < 0 for some i.
It is convenient to describe the proposed non-stationary SPE | which, for reasons
that will shortly become clear, I call the mutual minimax equilibrium (MME, for short)
| by describing two \phases" (or paths of play), and transition rules between them.
The initial phase (in which play begins) is called the cooperative phase; it constitutes
the PRE path. The other phase (to which play moves to if any player unilaterally
from the cooperative phase) is called the punishment phase.
Plays begins in the cooperative phase:
 The Cooperative Phase. Each player i (i = A;B) sets Li = LF
i , and does not
ght.
 Transition Rule 1. If any player unilaterally deviates in the cooperative phase,
then immediately play moves to the punishment phase.
 The Punishment Phase. For k periods LA = LB = 0, and both players choose to
ght. Thereafter, play returns to the cooperative phase.
 Transition Rule 2. If any player unilaterally deviates from the punishment phase,
36then immediately the punishment phase starts all over again.34
I now derive the incentive-compatibility conditions under which the pair of strategies
(implicitly) described above are in a SPE. Note that player i's equilibrium average
payo in the cooperative phase is V F
i . Letting zi denote player i's equilibrium average
payo at the start of the punishment phase, it is trivial to note that
zi = (1   
k





It thus follows that a unilateral, one-shot deviation from the cooperative phase by
player i is not protable for him if and only if
V
F




j ) + izi: (26)
Furthermore, a unilateral one-shot deviation from the punishment phase by player i
is not protable for him if and only if zi  (1   i)wi + izi | that is:
zi  wi; (27)
where wi is dened above in 19. Thus, player i has no incentive to deviate from his
proposed equilibrium strategy if and only if k is such that (26) and (27) hold. This
makes intuitive sense. On the one hand, k should be suciently large (thereby making
the punishment suciently severe) so as to provide player i with an incentive not to
deviate from the PRE path. But, on the other hand, k should be suciently small
(thereby making the punishment suciently lax) so as to provide player i with an
incentive to take part in the punishment of either player and thereafter return to the
cooperative phase. Thus, k has to determine both the thickness of the stick with which
punishment is meted out, and the attractiveness of the carrot which is obtained only
after the punishment is taken. I have thus established the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (The Mutual-Minimax Equilibrium (MME)). The pair of non-
stationary strategies (implicitly) described above (in terms of the cooperative and pun-
ishment phases and the two transition rules) is an SPE if and only if k satises (26)
34It may be noted that in the punishment phase both players use their respective minimax strate-
gies, which are, of course, identical (namely, \do no work, and ght"). Thus, whether it is player A or
player B who unilaterally deviates from the cooperative phase, in the punishment phase each player
minimaxes the other player for a certain number of periods. This idea of \mutual minimaxing" to
sustain cooperation in repeated games was rst used by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), but, it may
be noted, in the context of repeated normal-form (or static) games with the players having identical
discount factors.
37and (27) (for i;j = A;B with i 6= j). This SPE will be called the mutual-minimax
equilibrium (MME, for short). Since the MME path is the PRE path, in equilibrium
no ght ever occurs, and in each period player i (i = A;B) works for LF
i units of time.
Furthermore, of course, player i's MME payo in each period equals V F
i .
The following corollary addresses the issue of the existence of the MME. It shows, in
particular, that even if the players' private incentives to establish the property rights
are in conict, the MME exists provided that the players are suciently patient.
Corollary 8 (Existence of MME). For any parameter values there exists b A 2
(0;1) and b B 2 (0;1) such that if A 2 (b A;1) and B 2 (b B;1) then the MME exists.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Thus, in the limit as both A and B tend to one, the MME exists for any parameter
values. This result may be stated as follows: if each player does not discount future
payos, then secure property rights can emerge in the state-of-nature. The intuition
behind this result is that while the (short-run) benet to a player by a unilateral
deviation from an arrangement with secure property rights is nite, the (long-run) cost
from doing so becomes unboundedly large as his discount factor becomes arbitrarily
close to one. Although this is an important benchmark result, it is not particularly
useful, since the assumption of negligible discounting is not particularly plausible.
Nevertheless, this result emphasizes that making the future important to the players
can help provide them with appropriate incentives to respect the property rights.
5 The Role of Inter-Player Transfers of Output
It has been shown in the previous section that there exists a range of parameter
values under which the PRE path cannot be sustained in any SPE of the base model.
In particular, this is the case when the players' private incentives to establish the
property rights are in conict and they are not suciently patient. Does this mean
that under such conditions the players are doomed to live in the state-of-nature without
secure property rights? Or, perhaps more optimistically, does this mean that they will
resort to some mechanism which (in this two-player environment) might enable the
38emergence of secure property rights? In this section I explore the potential role of one
such mechanism, namely, inter-player transfers of output.
More precisely, I now extend the base model by allowing the players the option to
communicate and negotiate with each other regarding whether or not to establish the
property rights under consideration. In particular, the novel aspect is that a player
will have the option to oer the other player some output in return for getting him
to agree to the establishment of such property rights. Of course, since negotiated
agreements are not automatically enforceable, each player will have the option to (ex-
post) renege on his part of the agreement, whether or not the other player does so.
This means that only those agreements which satisfy certain incentive-compatibility
conditions are relevant to these negotiations. The objective of the analysis to follow
is to explore the extent to which such inter-player transfers of output enhances the
range of parameter values under which secure property rights can emerge.
5.1 An Extended Base Model with Bargaining
There are several alternative, plausible manners in which the opportunity to commu-
nicate and negotiate can be interlaced within the structure of the base model. As
such there are several alternative, plausible extensions of the base model in which
the mechanism of inter-player transfers of output exists. It turns out, however, that
(because of the underlying stationary structure of the environment) the main analyses
of all such extended models are identical. I now turn to a description of one such
extended model. A key characteristic of this extension of the base model is that the
players can communicate and negotiate only once, namely, at the beginning of time.
Before the beginning of period 1, the players meet to discuss whether or not to establish
the property rights under consideration, and, whether or not one of the players should
give some of his output to the other player in each period. Let the game form that
formally encapsulates this bargaining and communication process be denoted by ,
which has two types of outcomes: (i) the players reach an agreement t 2 <, with the
interpretation that in each period, player A will give t units of output to player B
and both players will not ght,35 and (ii) the players fail to reach an agreement. If
no agreement is struck, then play proceeds according to the base model. However, if
an agreement is struck, then (since it is not automatically enforceable) play proceeds
according to an extended version of the base model in which at the end of each period,
35Notice that t can be positive or negative. A negative t means that it is player B who will give
 t units of output to player A.
39before stage 2 takes place, the player who has to make the payment decides whether
or not to do so. Thus, notice that in each period, each player can choose whether or
not to renege on his part of the agreement.
There are several assumptions implicitly built into the above described extension of
the base model. First, if the players fail to reach an agreement at the beginning of
time, then they cannot attempt to do so in any later period. Second, an agreement
struck at the beginning of time cannot be renegotiated at any later date. Third, an
agreed transfer of output is constant across all periods. It is straightforward to consider
various alternative, plausible extensions of the base model in which one or more of
such assumptions is relaxed. For example, one could consider an extended model in
which the players communicate and negotiate at the beginning of each period over
whether or not to establish the property rights (with some transfer of output) for just
that period. As I mentioned above, because of the stationary structure that underlies
the environment, it turns out that the main analyses of such alternative, plausible
extended models are identical to the analysis of the extended model described above
in which the players communicate and negotiate only at the beginning of time.
In what follows, I assume, as seems plausible, that if the players fail to reach an
agreement in , then play (in the base model) proceeds according to the NE. The
motivation for this assumption is that if they do not agree to establish the property
rights when they are in face-to-face communication, then it is unlikely that secure
property rights will emerge implicitly via some non-stationary SPE of the base model.
Hence, it may be noted that if the players do not reach an agreement in , then player
i's payo in each period is V N
i .
5.2 Incentive-Compatible Agreements
An agreement in , which is characterized by a real number t, is self-enforcing if in
the extended base game that ensues there is a SPE whose equilibrium path is the
following extended PRE path: in each period, player i (i = A;B) sets Li = LF
i , the
agreed transfer t is implemented and no ght takes place. I assume that if any player
unilaterally deviates from this extended PRE path (i.e., violates the agreement), then
immediately play proceeds according to the NE. A player could deviate at any one
of the three stages within each period: either at stage 1 by choosing Li 6= LF
i , or, if
this is relevant to him, after stage 1 but before stage 2 by not transfering the agreed
output t to the other player (I call this stage, stage 1.5), or, at stage 2 by choosing
to ght. Through a straightforward extension of the arguments used in section 4.1,
it follows that for player A, a (one-shot, unilateral) deviation at stages 1, 1.5 and 2,
40respectively, are not protable if and only if the following three inequalities hold:
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Hence, I obtain the following result:36
Lemma 5 (Incentive-Compatible Agreements). An agreement to establish the
property rights with player A giving t 2 < units of output to player B in each period
is self-enforcing (or incentive-compatible) if the following two conditions hold:
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F
















An immediate consequence of Lemma 5 is that an agreement t is incentive-compatible
only if it is feasible in the sense that fA(LF
A)  t   fB(LF
B).
Another consequence of Lemma 5 is that (since i(LN
i ;LF
j ) > V N
i ) an agreement is
incentive-compatible only if V F
A   t > V N
A and V F
B + t > V N
B . This means that each
player strictly prefers reaching agreement on any incentive-compatible agreement to
not reaching any agreement. Although, therefore, the players have a common interest
to reach agreement on some incentive-compatible agreement (if one exists), they have
conicting (or divergent) interests over the set of such agreements (since each player's
payo from agreement is increasing in the amount of transfer of output that he receives
from the other player). A key point that, therefore, emerges here is as follows:
 If there exists an incentive-compatible agreement, then the players will reach agree-
ment to establish secure property rights, provided (as is plausible to assume) that the
equilibrium outcome in  is Pareto-ecient.
By using Lemma 5, I now derive the condition under which there exists an incentive-
compatible agreement. After substituting for i(LN
i ;LF
j ) (i;j = A;B with i 6= j) in
the inequalities stated in Lemma 5, and then simplifying, it follows that an agreement
36Notice that if the rst of these three inequalities holds, then the latter two inequalities also hold.
Furthermore, through a symmetric argument one can derive similar incentive-compatibility conditions
which would ensure that player B also would not have an incentive to violate the agreement.
41t 2 < is incentive-compatible if t satises the following inequalities:
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This implies that there exists an incentive-compatible agreement if and only if









Since the right-hand side of (30) is strictly positive, this means that in order for there
to exist an incentive-compatible agreement, the aggregate net surplus (or collective
incentive) from having the property rights, which is the left-hand side of (30), must
be suciently large; it is not enough that there just exists some aggregate net surplus,
i.e., A+B  0 | which, recall, holds for any parameter values.37 This means that
(30) holds in the limit as both A and B tend to one. At the other extreme, when
A = B = 0, inequality 30 does not hold, which can be seen after some manipulation
of this inequality. After substituting for A and B in (30), and then simplifying and
re-arranging terms, it follows that (30) can be re-written as follows:
 A +  B  0;
where for each i;j = A;B with i 6= j,
 i =
"
[1   pj(1   j)]fi(L
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By denition, if j = 0 then  i < 0, and, if j is suciently close to one then  i > 0.
Not surprisingly, an incentive-compatible agreement exists provided that the players
do not discount future payos too much. The key issue, however, is whether or not
such an agreement exists for a wider range of parameter values than for which the TSE
exists. It is trivial to note that any parameter values which satisfy (12) and (13) must
also satisfy (30). Hence, if the TSE exists, then an incentive-compatible agreement
also exists. However, notice that there exists parameter values which satisfy (30), but
which will not satisfy (12) and (13). Thus, there exists parameter values under which
the TSE does not exist, but an incentive-compatible agreement does exist. This is
the case, for example, for some parameter values such that i < 0 for some i. Hence,
when the players' private incentives to establish the property rights are in conict (such
37As would be expected, the requirement that an agreement be incentive-compatible is somewhat
constraining.
42as when one player is quite strong but quite unproductive, while the reverse is the
case regarding the other player), inter-player transfers of output can be a mechanism
through which secure property rights get established.
Stated more generally, the results established here imply that the mechanism of inter-
player transfers of output does allow for the emergence of secure property rights in
circumstances in which they would not otherwise emerge. The intuition for this conclu-
sion follows by noting that when the players negotiate over whether or not to establish
secure property rights with an appropriate, per-period transfer of some output be-
tween them, their respective private incentives are no longer relevant to the issue of
the emergence of secure property rights; it is their collective incentive that takes on
centre stage. More precisely, since their collective incentive (namely, A +B) is the
sum of their respective private incentives, the players' private incentives do continue
matter, but only to the extent that they determine the collective incentive. For ex-
ample, conicting private incentives no longer pose the kind of threat that they did
in the analysis of section 4, since what matters to the analysis in this section is the
collective incentive.
5.3 Nash Bargains
The insights derived in the previous subsection (concerning the role of the mechanism
of inter-player transfers of output on the emergence of secure property rights) are
based on teasing out the implications of the requirement that negotiated agreements
must be incentive-compatible, and, on the plausible assumption that the outcome in
 will be Pareto-ecient. As such these insights are fairly general, since, in particular,
they are independent of the exact nature of the agreed transfer (which would clearly
depend on the details of the bargaining process ).
However, in order to develop some further (albeit specic) insights, I now assume
that the bargaining process  is such that the equilibrium agreed transfer, denoted
by t, can be characterized using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS, for short) with
the disagreement point being the payo pair (V N
A ;V N
B ). As is well-known | see, for
example, Muthoo (1999) | this can easily be justied by assuming that  is the
Rubinsteinian, alternating-oers bargaining process.






Thus, interestingly, in the NBS, the player who has to transfer some of his output in
each period to the other player is the one whose private net benet from having the
property rights is higher. If these private net benets are identical, then no transfer
of output takes place.
Now, t will be the equilibrium agreed transfer provided that it is incentive-compatible.
After substituting for t = t (using (31)) into (28) and (29), and then simplifying and
re-arranging terms, it thus follows that t is incentive-compatible if









That is, if the parameters are such that
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This immediately implies, for example, that the agreement with the Nash bargained
transfer t is incentive-compatible when the players' private incentives to establish
the property rights are in conict and they do not have high discount factors. The
analysis in section 4 showed that under such conditions secure property rights could
not emerge. In contrast, the result obtained here shows that the mechanism of inter-
player transfers of output can provide the basis for their emergence via self-enforcing,
negotiated agreements.
38This is obtained by rst noting that in the NBS the players split equally the aggregate net surplus
A + A. Hence, player A's utility payo in the NBS is u
A = V N
A + (A + B)=2. Consequently,
since (by denition) the transfer in the NBS is t = V F
A   u
A, it follows that t is as stated in (31).
446 Summary and Concluding Remarks
A main, key contribution of this paper is my model of the state-of-nature. It cap-
tures the essential, basic elements of the strategic interaction between two players in
the state-of-nature. Although, as I shall discuss below, the model contains several,
restrictive assumptions, an important aspect of my model is that it provides a basic
framework that can be extended and/or modied to capture various, omitted features
of the strategic interaction between the two players in the state-of-nature.
Some of the most fundamental insights obtained in this paper concerning the origins
of secure (or self-enforcing) property rights are as follows:
 Heterogeneity in the players' ghting and productive skills plays a crucial role in
determining their incentives to establish secure property rights. In particular, there
exist congurations of the players' ghting and productive skills | such as when one
player is quite unproductive but very strong, while the other player is quite productive
but very weak | under which the players' private incentives are in conict.
 In order to promote and maintain incentives (private and collective), improvements
in the players' productive skills (or economic prosperity) should go hand-in-hand with
improvements in their ghting skills (or military technologies).
 If the players' ghting and productive skills are such that their private incentives to
establish the property rights are in conict, then in order for secure property rights to
emerge, it is necessary that the players communicate with each other and negotiate over
whether or not to establish the property rights with an appropriate, per-period transfer
of output between them. That is, in such circumstances, the use of the mechanism of
inter-player transfers of output is vital for the emergence of secure property rights.
 When the players' private incentives are not in conict, then secure property rights
might emerge without the mechanism of inter-player transfers of output. The likeli-
hood of this happening is higher the more concerned are the players for their future
payos, or the greater are their ghting skills, or the lower are their productive skills.
 Improvements in the ghting skills of a militarily strong player (such as the USA)
enhances the likelihood of the emergence of secure property rights. On the other hand,
improvements in the ghting skills of a militarily weak player enhances the likelihood
that existing secure property rights become insecure.
I now turn to a discussion of the main limitations of my model as a model of the
45state-of-nature with two players. Before I do so, let me note upfront that addressing
some of these limitations | by extending and/or modifying my model | will not
necessarily require any conceptual innovations (although the analyses of some of these
extensions may be technically demanding). In contrast, when extending my model to
an environment with three (or more) players, new conceptual issues will necessarily
arise such as the issue of who forms a coalition with whom.39
First, a simplifying, but restrictive assumption that underlies my model is that the
players cannot make any investments in their ghting and productive skills. Clearly,
this assumption should be relaxed in future research. One potential way of extending
the base model to allow for such investments is as follows. At the beginning of each
period, before stage 1, each player has the option to spend some time to improve his
ghting skill and/or his productive skill. By incorporating the possibility of such costly
investments, the equilibrium growth rates of the players' ghting and productive skills
can be determined, which, in turn, will aect the dynamics of the likelihood of the
emergence of secure property rights.
Second, it is important to relax the implicit assumption that a player cannot steal the
other player's endowments (of productive and military technologies, and/or, of time)
| in my model, a player can only steal the other player's nal output. This, of course,
raises some important issues. For example, stealing all of a player's endowments is like
making that player one's slave | which is, however, not the case if one only steals that
player's technologies. The issues of how a player might then make use of the stolen
endowments, and, of how he would keep them over time | in the face of the other
player's incentive to ght back | need to be addressed. A key question is whether
or not there can exist congurations of the players' ghting and productive skills such
that in equilibrium one player enslaves the other, and, maintains the slave's incentives
not to break free by some appropriate, minimal lump-sum transfer of output.
Third, it would be interesting to explore the implications of relaxing some of the
informational assumptions. For example, I have assumed that a player's output is
observable by the other player. It would be interesting to explore the implications of an
extension of my model in which a player receives an imperfect signal of his opponent's
output level. A focal question is whether or not such imperfect observability, which
seems like a reasonable assumption, adversely aects the likelihood of the emergence
of secure property rights.
Fourth, there is no room for specialization and trade in my model. It would be
39In my companion paper, Muthoo (In Preparation), I construct and study a model of the state-
of-nature with three players that is based upon the model studied in the current paper.
46interesting and useful to extend my model by having, for example, two consumption
goods. In such an environment, secure property rights might have a relatively better
chance of emerging when each player specializes in the production of one good, and,
then obtains the other good through trade with his opponent.
There are, of course, several other potentially fruitful extensions of my model; exten-
sions, like those discussed above, which would enhance our understanding of the topic
under consideration.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2(b)
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After substituting for the derivative of LN

























Furthemore, notice that the derivative of V N
i with respect to pi is continuous in pi, and that









where  is dened above in (34). Since (by the hypothesis stated in Proposition 2(b)) f000
j  0
and v000
j  0), the derivative of  with respect to pi is positive. Hence, the second derivative
of V N
i with respect to pi is strictly negative. The desired conclusion follows immediately
from the above results concerning the nature of the derivative of V N
i with respect to pi.
40These results are based on the results that LN
j ! LF
j as pi ! 0 and LN
j ! 0 as pi ! 1.
47DERIVATION OF CONDITION (17)
After dierentiating i with respect to pi, it follows that
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Thus, since the derivative of V N
i with respect to pi is identical to the derivative of pifj(LN
j )
with respect to pi, it follows that
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j ) T 0:
Since (by the denition of i) i = (1   i)pij, it follows that
@i
@pi




+ (1   i)pijfj(LF
j ) T 0:
The desired conclusion (namely, condition (17)) follows immediately (since pij > 0).
PROOF OF COROLLARY 8
The proof to follow is an adaption of the argument that underlies the proof of Theorem 1
in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). Choose b A and b B close to one so that for each i = A;B,
V F
i > (1   b i)i(LN
i ;LF
j ) (36)
and (27) holds when k = 1.41 If, with k = 1, (26) is violated for some i, then raise k until
(26) is satised for both i (i = A and i = B) | which is possible since (i) zi is continuous
and decreasing in k, and, as k tends to innity, zi tends to vi(T) (which is strictly less than
V F
i ), and (ii) (36) holds. Now, since zi is increasing in i, by taking b i close enough to one
we can ensure that (27) will be satised for the rst k for which (26) holds. The Corollary
now follows immediately, since for any A > b A and B > b B there exists a k0 such that for
each i = A;B, (26) and (27) hold for such disount factors and k = k0.
41This is possible since V F > wi > 0.
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